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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions1
This memorandum argues that Hamdan’s conspiracy charge is a charge triable by
military commission. Conspiracy has roots in international law dating back to post-World War
II Military Tribunals. In addition, the theory of conspiracy is very similar, if not the same as, the
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugolsavia.
Part III of this memorandum discusses the background of conspiracy law and its use in
the United States and the United Kingdom. It details the elements of the crime and the rationale
behind it. Part IV begins with the Nuremberg Tribunal’s application of conspiracy to crimes to
commit war of aggression and the controversy behind that charge, which seems to have instilled
great reluctance in the international community from continuing to use that term except with
respect to charges of genocide. Other Tribunals in France and Britain charged individuals with
conspiracy, but used it as a theory of liability, rather than as an offense in itself. The
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, have
established conspiracy as a crime, but have limited its use to the context of genocide. In order to
punish guilty individuals who could potentially slip through holes in the ICTY statute, the
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic established the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise,
which is essentially the same thing as the form of conspiracy used by the French and British
Military Tribunals after WWII. Lastly, conspiracy law is established in several different
countries outside the United States, suggesting that the concerns of ex post facto application of
law are no longer a legitimate concern.
Based on this information it can be concluded that:
1

Issue: Does the conspiracy charge on our current charge sheet for Hamdan constitute a war crime or other crime
triable by military commission?
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(a) The elements of conspiracy (as a crime) and the internationally recognized doctrine of
joint criminal enterprise/common purpose are the same.2
(b) The rationale behind both joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy is to punish those
individuals involved in criminality who cannot be found guilty of committing criminal
offenses on their own (due to lack of evidence or peripheral role) or through the theory of
command responsibility.
(c) In joint criminal enterprise, an overt act must be committed in addition to the agreement.
These elements are the same as are required by the Rules and Regulations of the
Department of Defense with respect to the crime of conspiracy.
II. Factual Background
Qaida-Al-Jihad, better known as Al Qaida, was established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988
in response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The goal of the organization is to promote
Muslim brotherhood and protect the law of God (according to Al-Qaida’s fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam) by overthrowing Western governments who are considered to be
interfering with the goals of these Islamic nations by acting in the interest of the western
governments and western corporations.3 From the time of inception to the present date, Al Qaida
has been training militants from many regions to obey the fatwa (legal pronouncement based on
Islamic religious law) that declared “to kill Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is

2

See generally, RAJIV K. PUNJA, WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE” AS DEFINED
BY THE ICTY CASE LAW AND CONSPIRACY IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS?, http://law.case.edu/war-crimesresearch-portal/memoranda/JointCriminalEnterprise.pdf (Fall 2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
22] (This memo discusses the lack of clarity in the elements of both joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy. In its
extensive analysis, this memo only draws on the main distinctions between the two doctrines, but not the
similarities.)
3

Al Qaida, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaida [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51]
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an individual duty of every Muslim who is able.”4 Under the guidance of Osama Bin Laden and
other Al-Qaida leaders, militants have actively sought to fulfill this mission. Although Al Qaida
has been responsible for many plots to further this goal, the largest attacks that this organization
is believed to have been responsible for are the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. In addition to these, Al Qaida is believed to have been responsible for
the attacks against the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, as well
as the attack against the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000.5
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, President Bush issued a Military
Order stating that the attacks on the United States created an armed conflict and an extreme state
of emergency, authorizing the trial of individuals subject to the military order by military
commission.6 Any non-United States citizen who has “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired
to commit acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore” is subject to this
order.7
According to the Rules and Regulations of the United States Department of Defense8,
defendant Salim Ahmed Hamdan (“Hamdan”) was charged with willfully and knowingly
4

Al Qaida, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaida [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51]

5

United States v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Charge Sheet at ¶ 11 (hereinafter “Hamdan Charge Sheet”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 54]
6

PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY ORDER ON THE DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF CERTAIN NON-CITIZENS IN THE
WAR AGAINST TERRORISM, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52] (This
order was written based on the Commander-in-Chief power vested in the President of the United States, along with a
Joint Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of military force. See Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224)
7

Id. at §2(a)(ii).

8

See Rules and Regulations of the Department of Defense CRIMES AND ELEMENTS OF TRIALS BY MILITARY
COMMISSION, 68 Fed. Reg. 39381 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53] (This document
specifies conspiracy as an alternate form of liability, stating that a person is criminally liable as a principal, even if
another individual perpetrated the offense. Conspiracy occurs when an individual enters into an agreement to
commit certain substantive offenses, or if the individual joins an enterprise of persons who shared a common
criminal purpose that intended to commit substantive offenses triable by military commission.)

9

conspiring with Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders and members to commit the
following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects,
murder by an unprivileged belligerent, destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent and
terrorism.9
Between the years of 1996-2000, Hamdan delivered and picked up weapons, ammunition
and other supplies to Al-Qaida members and Taliban warehouses for Al-Qaida use, bought and
made available Toyota Hi Lux trucks to protect Osama Bin Laden, and served as a driver for
Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders at the time of the attacks on the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center.10

III. A General Discussion of Conspiracy in the United States and the United Kingdom
The inception of conspiracy can be traced back to the reign of Edward I. His conspiracy
statute was narrow in scope, stating that people who combine forces to bring false appeals,
obtain false indictments or pursue vexatious litigation could be regarded as conspirators.11 The
Poulterer’s Case expanded the theory of conspiracy, so that it resembled the principles applied
in many countries today. This case gave rise to the notion that the essence of conspiracy is the
agreement, so the agreement is punishable even when the purpose is not achieved.12

About a

century later, conspiracy law took a very broad turn to reflect the climate of the courts, and an
9

Hamdan Charge Sheet, supra note 5 at ¶12 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 54]

10

Id. at ¶13(b) subsections 1-4

11

See P. WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (Cambridge University Press
1921) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7] cited in WAYNE R. LA FAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. West
Group 2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
12

See Poulterer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37] (In this case,
the defendants had combined forces to bring a false claim against a clearly innocent man. Since the man was not
found guilty, the defendants claimed that there was no conspiracy.)
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agreement to do anything immoral (even if the act was not in violation of a law) was punishable
as a conspiracy.13 In 1832, Lord Denman made his famous statement that in order for someone
to be indicted for conspiracy, they must “either do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful
means.”14 This definition is currently used by the United Nations War Crimes Commission to
define conspiracy.15
A. The Elements of Conspiracy
In general, the elements of the common law crime of conspiracy are: (a) an agreement
between two or more persons, which constitutes the act, and (b) intent16 to achieve the objective
of the agreement.17
As stated earlier, the crux of conspiracy is the agreement. By criminalizing the
agreement, law enforcement agents are able to prevent (or attempt to prevent) crimes before they
occur, while attacking against the dangers of group criminality.18 In theory, if the agreement

13

See FRANCIS B. SAYRE, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922) (hereinafter “SAYRE”) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
14

See Rex v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485 (1832) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45]

15

VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
(Transnational Publishers, 1998) (hereinafter “MORRIS & SCHARF ICTR”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10]
16

See WAYNE R. LA FAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. West Group 2000) 628 (hereinafter “LA FAVE”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12] (The focus of conspiracy has always been on the agreement which is not only
the act, but it is predominantly a mental act. Thus, the required mental state for this crime has not been clear and
“has often been dealt with ambiguously by the courts[.]” Technically, there are two mental states required to
commit conspiracy- (a) the intent to agree and (b) the intent to achieve the criminal objective. The confusion results
because the intent to agree is so inherent in the agreement itself that it is assumed that the act of agreement reveals
the intent to agree. Therefore, it seems that the mental state required to make the agreement criminal is the intent to
achieve a criminal objective.); See also United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760 (1970) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 47] (The main issue on appeal in this case are jury instructions, however when
determining intent for conspiracy, the court cited a case saying that conspiracy cannot exist without at least the
degree of criminal intent needed for the substantive offense itself.); See also DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY, 72 Harv. L. Rev. (1959) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
17

LA FAVE (4th ed. West Group 2000), supra note 16 at 621 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]

18

LA FAVE (4th ed. West Group 2000), supra note 16 at 620 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; see
also KENNETH A. DAVID, THE MOVEMENT TOWARD STATUTE-BASED CONSPIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
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itself is the crime, persons who wish to withdraw from the conspiracy can still help prevent the
crime from occurring and avoid being criminally charged.19
Traditionally, conspiracy is a “product of courts rather than of legislatures.”20 However
in recent years, Britain and the United States have attempted to codify the law.21 Although
British attempts to codify the law were initially more successful than attempts in the United
States, today many states as well as the United States Federal Government have codified
conspiracy.22
Many of these statutes require that in addition to the agreement, an overt act23 must be
committed in furtherance of the common objective.24 If there is no statute governing the crime,
Common Law conspiracy (which does not require an overt act) is applied.25 It is important to

AND THE UNITED STATES,

25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 951, 953 (1993) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab

19]
19

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (6) (1962) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]

20

KENNETH A. DAVID, THE MOVEMENT TOWARD STATUTE-BASED CONSPIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
THE UNITED STATES, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 951, 953 (1993) (hereinafter “DAVID”) [Reproduced in

accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
21

Id. at 959

22

18 U.S.C.A. § 371 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]

23

DAVID, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 951 (1993), supra note 20 at 959 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 19] (The Criminal Law Act of 1977, which was the first codification of conspiracy in Britain, does not seem to
have required an overt act.)

24

LA FAVE (4th ed. West Group 2000), supra note 16 at 626 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; See
also United States v. Hyde & Schneider, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]
(“Conspiracy cannot alone constitute an offense. It needs the addition of an overt act. […] It constitutes the
execution or part execution of the conspiracy and all incur guilt by it, or rather complete their guilt by it.”); See also
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 50]:
“It is not necessary that an overt act be the substantive crime charged in the indictment as the object
of the conspiracy. […] The function of the overt act in a conspiracy is simply to manifest that the
conspiracy is still at work, and is neither a project still resting solely in the minds of the
conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence.”

25

United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d. 283 (1992) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49]
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note, however, that there is some debate as to whether the overt act is evidence or an element of
the offense.26 The issue is still open to construction even though the current United States
Supreme Court considers the act as evidence of the offense.27 For example, the federal statute
governing conspiracy states that persons can be punished if they conspire and act to effect the
object of the conspiracy.28 Similarly, the elements of conspiracy in the Department of Defense
Rules also include the overt act as an element of the offense.29

B. The Rationale for Conspiracy
In the United States, conspiracy is regarded as one of the most useful prosecutorial
tools.30 In many cases, conspiracy allows prosecution against guilty individuals who could
escape punishment simply because they did not commit the actual crime, or their acts were not
blatantly obvious.31 The all-encompassing nature of this crime has been highly criticized by
many, because in theory, there are no limits as to what defines “unlawful.”32 As a result, there is
not complete unanimity in the law. Civil-law countries have a narrow interpretation of
conspiracy, limiting it by statute to only the most dangerous situations, while common law
26

United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d. 283 (1992), supra note 25 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49]

27

United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d 283 (1992), supra note 25 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49];
see United Stated v. Hyde & Schneider, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), supra note 24 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 48] (As detailed in this case, the Supreme Court did not always consider the overt act evidence of the
offense; it was an element.)
28

18 U.S.C.A. § 371 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]

29

Rules and Regulations of the Department of Defense CRIMES AND ELEMENTS OF TRIALS BY MILITARY
COMMISSION, 68 Fed. Reg. 39381 (2003), supra note 8 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
30

LA FAVE (4th ed. West Group 2000), supra note 16 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]

31

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920 (1959) (hereinafter “CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
32

LA FAVE (4th ed. West Group 2000), supra note 16 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
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countries have used a broader approach, relying on judicial interpretation.33 However, it remains
the concern of both civil and common law countries that “collective action toward an antisocial
end involves a greater risk than individual action toward the same end.”34
The idea is that collective activity makes it more likely that crime will succeed because
sheer numbers allow for more efficient division of labor; all co-conspirators support and
encourage one another; the type and ability of harm increases because what one person cannot
accomplish, several can.35 The view that collective criminality is worse than individual
criminality is the basis for making the agreement the focus of conspiracy, thereby enabling law
enforcement officials the opportunity of early detection and prevention.36
In the United States, conspiracy is a crime. In the international setting, conspiracy has
generally been regarded as a theory of liability. Therefore, internationally, the use of conspiracy
is more limited. However, conspiracy, or crimes resembling conspiracy have been established in
both the international system as well as in countries outside the United States. Furthermore, the
elements of conspiracy are the same as the elements of other crimes tried in the Military
Tribunals.

33

DAVID, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 951 (1993), supra note 20 at 959 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 19]

34

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920 (1959), supra note 31 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 15]

35

Id.

36

See DAVID, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 951 (1993), supra note 20 at 959 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 19]; see also CONSPIRACY LAW, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920 (1959), supra note 31 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 15] (This law review also noted that conspiracies are not limited to the particular instance. That is
to say that one conspiracy leads to another conspiracy, making it a continuous act. So, this further buttresses the
argument that the focus of conspiracy should be on the agreement because that allows prevention of crime.) United
States v. Braverman, 317 U.S. 49 (1942) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46], (holds the opposite
view regarding continuous conspiracy, saying that a single agreement does not become several conspiracies because
it continues over a period of time.)
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IV. The Use of Conspiracy and Conspiracy like Theories Worldwide
A. The crime of “conspiracy to commit crimes of aggression” was established at
Nuremberg.
In order to effectively prosecute the individuals of the Nazi regime for their horrific
deeds, the United States proposed that Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter37 include conspiracy
to commit any of the crimes enumerated therein. However, this proposal was met with
resistance.38

It was agreed that conspiracy to commit the crime of aggression was a separate

offense, however conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity was not.39 It
should be noted, however, that according to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Nuremberg
Charter, the use of the word “conspiracy” suggests complicity to commit war crimes or crimes
against humanity, thereby making conspiracy a theory of liability instead of a technical offense.40
One might argue that including conspiracy in the Nuremberg Charter was a great mistake,
as the decision was among the most heavily criticized aspects of the Nuremberg trials. One
member of the defense counsel argued that conspiracy could not apply as no agreement existed
because (a) when the members of the Nazi party accused of conspiracy joined the regime, they
could not have known the criminal nature of the acts to be taken in the future; and (b) there is no
37

THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (United Nations, New
York, 1949) (hereinafter “NUREMBERG CHARTER”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]

38

VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (New York, Transnational Publishers, 1995) (hereinafter “MORRIS & SCHARF ICTY”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11]; see also HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE ICTY STATUTE FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A COMPARISON WITH THE PAST AND A LOOK TO THE FUTURE, 21 Syracuse J. of Int’l L. &
Com.1 (1995) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17] (This article offers a general discussion of the
evolution of the Military Tribunals, noting that the crime of conspiracy concerned civil law countries.)
39

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOLUME XV (London,
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949) (hereinafter “U.N. LAW REPORTS”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 9]
40

NUREMBERG CHARTER (United Nations, New York, 1949), supra note 37 at 73 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25]

15

such thing as voluntary agreement in a dictatorship.41 With respect to this argument, the
Tribunal said that a Nazi member would have known of the numerous murders that occurred;
continuous assistance of this illegality constituted knowledge and commission.42 Other defense
counsel argued that this charge of conspiracy criminalized actions ex post facto and was
therefore illegal.43 The ex post facto argument bears some merit, as the concept of conspiracy
was foreign to Germany at the time, and retroactive application of law would never be permitted
in an American court.44 However, the Tribunal was not content with acquitting Nazi members of
the ghastly crimes they committed. The court relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1939,
wherein 63 nations, Germany included, declared that war was not the solution to international
controversies, and in so doing renounced non-pacific means of conflict resolution, including
aggressive war.45
It can be inferred, from the defense criticisms and the prosecution’s retorts that the
elements of “conspiracy to commit war of aggression” are: (a) knowledge of the criminal
purpose of the organization; (b) voluntary association with the organization despite having
knowledge; (c) acts or omissions in furtherance of the common criminal purpose.46 Thus, the

41

See NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT Vol. 1, Office of the United States Chief of
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality at 40 (hereinafter “NAZI CONSPIRACY”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 6]
42

NAZI CONSPIRACY, supra note 41 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]

43

NAZI CONSPIRACY, supra note 41 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]; see also SHELDON GLUECK,
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946) (hereinafter “GLUECK”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
44

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL (Continuum New York 2002) (hereinafter “SCHARFMILOSEVIC”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
45

NUREMBERG CHARTER (United Nations, New York, 1949), supra note 41 at 43-46 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25]

46

GLUECK (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), supra note 43 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
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Tribunal established that conspiracy could be triable as a military crime. Though the Nuremberg
application of conspiracy (as a theory of liability) was different from the U.S. application (where
conspiracy is a crime in itself), conspiracy had been established in the international setting, by a
prominent military tribunal.
B. Other post WWII military tribunals recognized conspiracy to commit war
crimes.
Despite the Nuremberg Tribunal’s resistance to broaden conspiracy to include war
crimes and crimes against humanity, several French and British military tribunals47 found that
conspiracy to commit a war crime was triable by military commission. Based on the French
Code Penal, which states that any undertaking by an association formed to commit crimes
against persons or property is a crime against public peace,48 the French Military Tribunal at
Marseilles found Henri Georges Stadelhofer guilty of conspiracy.49 Albert Raskin was similarly
found guilty of conspiracy by a French Military Tribunal at Lyon.50
In the British Military Court at Almelo, Holland, Otto Sandrock and three others were
charged with violating the laws and usages of war when they killed Pilot Officer Gerald Hood (a
British prisoner of war) and Bote van der Wal (a Dutch civilian).51 Although all four members

47

These cases were discussed in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15, July, 1999
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
48

U.N. LAW REPORTS (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949), supra note 39 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
49

Id.

50

Id.

51

THE ALMELO TRIAL: Trial of Otto Sandrock and three Others, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOLUME I (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949) (hereinafter
“THE ALMELO TRIAL”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31] (Non-commissioned German officers

executed both the British Pilot Officer and Bote van der Wal, whose house the officer was hiding out in. For each
execution, one officer stood guard by the car to prevent people from going near the area while the execution took
place, one gave the order and the other officer fired the shot.)

17

of the group did not commit the murders, the Judge Advocate held that all three knew that they
were going into the woods with the purpose of killing the officer and each member assisted in his
own way.52 The same sequence of acts was repeated several days later when killing the Dutch
civilian. Even though there was indication that the accused were acting according to Sandrock’s
orders, there is nothing that suggests that they were unaware of the proper laws and usages of
war.53 Thus, the British Tribunal found that the accused members who did not fire the guns were
equally guilty because they were aware of the unlawful common enterprise and they each
contributed by acting accordingly.54
In Kurt Goebell et al.,55 a United States Military Court held that the senior officers, some
policemen, the Mayor of Borkam, some privates, a civilian, and the leader of the Reich Labour
Corps were all guilty of war crimes since they “willfully, deliberately and wrongfully
encouraged, aided and abetted, and participated in the assaults.”56 The Prosecutor in this case
put forth the idea of common purpose by describing the accused as “cogs in the wheel of
common design, all equally important, each cog doing the part assigned to it. And the wheel of
wholesale murder could not turn without all the cogs.”57

52

THE ALMELO TRIAL (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949), supra note 51 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

In August 1944, a United States Flying Fortress was forced to land on the German island of Borkum. The seven
crew members were taken as prisoners of war and paraded through the streets of Borkum, where members of the
Reich Labor Corps. struck them with shovels, and then the Mayor instructed civilians kill these prisoners “like
dogs.” Eventually, all the prisoners were shot by German soldiers.

56

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Judgment in Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter “Tadic
Judgment”) at ¶210 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
57

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 210 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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Similarly, in the Essen Lynching case,58 a German Army Captain gave a German private
orders to take three allied prisoners of war to a Luftwaffe unit for interrogation. The captain told
the private not to interfere if the crowd began to molest or attack the airman. The captain also
suggested that these airmen should be shot.59 All of these orders were given to the private within
earshot of the crowd that gathered near the barracks. The men were finally killed by being
thrown off a bridge by the mob. The prosecutor argued that the acts leading up to the deaths
were inseparable, and that even though the captain did not take any part in the physical acts that
killed the airmen, he was as responsible as anyone else.60
The elements of conspiracy to commit war crimes, as established by these French and
British Tribunals are (a) knowledge of criminal purpose, and (b) an act in furtherance of the
criminal purpose. These cases suggest that if there is knowledge of the criminal purpose and
individuals act to further it, there is an implied agreement between them. Again, these cases use
conspiracy as a theory of liability, rather than as a crime itself. Therefore, unlike the U.S.
system, the focus is not on the agreement. However, as can be inferred by the statements of the
Judges and Judge advocates, the rationale for conspiracy as used in these post-Nuremberg
Tribunals is the same as the rationale in U.S. conspiracy law- to punish individuals who
collectively acted to commit crimes.

58

Cited in Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

59

THE ESSEN LYNCHING CASE The Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others, British Military Court for the Trial of War
Criminals, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOLUME I, 88
(London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949) (hereinafter “THE ESSEN LYNCHING CASE”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
60

THE ESSEN LYNCHING CASE (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949), supra note 59 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
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C. Conspiracy to Commit Genocide as defined by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).
As stated above, the decision to include conspiracy as a war crime at Nuremberg was
subject to much criticism after the conclusion of the trial. Perhaps, in an effort to avoid such
criticism, the drafters of the ICTY and the ICTR statutes declined to include conspiracy to
commit an offense within the Tribunals’ jurisdiction, except for conspiracy to commit
genocide.61
Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal that recognized individual criminal responsibility
through membership in a criminal organization,62 the drafters of the ICTY and ICTR statutes
chose to apply conspiracy to the crime of genocide.63 Thus, for the first time in an international
Tribunal, conspiracy was recognized as a crime itself. Furthermore, the ICTY and ICTR made it
possible for persons to be convicted of both conspiracy to commit genocide as well as the crime
of genocide.64
In Prosecutor v. Musema the ICTR Trial Chamber noted that the serious nature of
genocide justifies criminalization of the agreement to commit the underlying offense, instead of
61

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
SINCE 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25
May 1993, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (1993) (hereinafter “ICTY Statute”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 30]; (In Article 4(3)(b) of the ICTY statute and Article (2)(3)(b) of the ICTR statute specifically list conspiracy
to commit genocide a crime triable by military commission.); see The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment in Trial Chamber, 27, January, 2000, at ¶ 185 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 38] (The Trial Chamber, citing the summary records of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21
September- 10 December 1948, noted that “the Genocide Convention suggest[s] that the rationale for including such
as offense was to ensure, in view of the serious nature of the crime of genocide, that the mere agreement to commit
genocide should be punishable even if no preparatory act has taken place.”)
62

NUREMBERG CHARTER (United Nations, New York, 1949), supra note 41 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 25]

63

MORRIS & SCHARF ICTR (Transnational Publishers, 1998), supra note 15 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 10]

64

Id.
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committing the actual offense.65 More importantly, the Chamber distinguished between the Civil
Law and Common Law theories of conspiracy. In Civil Law, simple conspiracy exists when two
or more persons have a concerted agreement to act, while second level conspiracy exists when
the concerted agreement is followed by preparatory acts.66 The Common Law crime of
conspiracy is defined as an agreement, between two or more persons, to further a common,
criminal objective.67 The Civil Law definition of simple conspiracy is quite narrow in scope,
making it more logical to use the Civil Law definition of second level conspiracy for more
serious crimes.68 The elements of conspiracy as defined by the Department of Defense are the
same- agreement followed by preparatory acts.69
Despite its restricted use, conspiracy to commit genocide, like other forms of conspiracy,
requires an agreement to commit genocidal acts.70 The ICTR’s use of conspiracy is similar to

65

The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment in Trial Chamber, 27, January, 2000,
(hereinafter “Musema Judgment”) at ¶ ¶ 185-198 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

66

Musema Judgement, supra note 65 at ¶ 189 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

67

Id. at ¶ 190.

68

Musema Judgement, supra note 65 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

69

Rules and Regulations of the Department of Defense CRIMES AND ELEMENTS OF TRIALS BY MILITARY
COMMISSION, 68 Fed. Reg. 39381 (2003), supra note 8 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
70

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by Security Council on 8 November 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (hereinafter “ICTR Statute”) at Article (2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]; See also
MORRIS & SCHARF ICTR (Transnational Publishers, 1998), supra note 15 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10] (The crime consists of two essential elements: (1) the requisite intent of mental state, and (2) the
prohibited act or omission. The mental state for genocide is the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.”)
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the use of conspiracy in the United States.71 More importantly, the ICTY and ICTR statutes’
definition of conspiracy recognized conspiracy as a crime in itself, not just a theory of liability.

D. The ICTY Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise72
Joint Criminal Enterprise was first established by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic.73 In
general, it exists when two or more people agree to carry out a crime, and participate in
physically committing the crime by encouraging, aiding, abetting or assisting another to commit
the crime.74 In formulating the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic predominantly relied on jurisprudence from post-Nuremberg Control Council Law No. 10
trials, as well as a variety of other European Military Tribunals.75
In Tadic the Appeals Chamber was to determine whether or not one person is criminally
responsible for another’s acts if both persons were acting to further a common plan.76 The
Appeals Chamber made a basic assumption that criminal responsibility is the principle of
71

MORRIS & SCHARF ICTR (Transnational Publishers, 1998), supra note 63 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 10]

72

See generally CHRISTOPHER J. KNEZEVIC, Case Western Reserve University School of Law International War
Crimes Research Lab: JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE- WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION REQUIRED FOR
CONVICTION? AN EXHAUSTIVE MEMO OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ON JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE,
http://law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/memoranda/Cknezevic.pdf [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 13]
73

See generally Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

74

SCHARF- MILOSEVIC, (Continuum New York 2002), supra note 44 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab

4]
75

See Prosecutor v. Mulitinovic et al., Case No: IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction- Joint Criminal Enterprise 21 May 2003 (hereinafter “Ojdanic Judgment”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43] (Despite the Tribunal’s establishment of substantial case law from World War II
in the Tadic Judgment, Ojdanic argued that joint criminal enterprise was not in the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The
Appeals Chamber disagreed and said that a crime or form of liability does not need to be explicitly stated in the
statute to come under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, although the Chamber argued that joint criminal enterprise
was included in the “non-exhaustive nature” of Article 7(1).)
76

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 185 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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personal culpability in both national and international legal systems.77 The purpose of this
doctrine was not only to punish those who acted criminally, even though they may not have
materially performed the criminal act, but to hold them liable without “understate[ing] their
degree of criminal responsibility.”78 This idea is embodied in the Secretary General’s report,
which states: “The Secretary-general believes that all persons who participate in the planning,
preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such violations.”79 This statement is very similar to
the “cogs of a wheel” concept discussed in the Borkum Island Case.80 Embodying these ideas,
the Appeals Chamber divided the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise into three categories.
Although the Chamber distinguished between mental states for each category, the focus
remained on the agreement and participation of the common criminal purpose or design.

i. Category One: All co-defendants possess the same criminal intention.
In this category of joint criminal enterprise, the co-defendants must participate in at least
one aspect of the common design voluntarily, with intent to commit the crime.81 The Chamber

77

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 189 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]; see also U.N.S.C.
Res. 827, adopted May 25, 1993 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30] (Article 7(1) says, “ A person
who planned, instigated, ordered committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution
of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.” In
addition, the ICTY statute lists grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions which recognize conspiracy, incitement,
attempt and complicity for crimes of genocide. See Art. 4(3))
78

Tadic Judgement, supra note 56 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

79

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 190, citing Report of the Secretary-General of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993 (emphasis added) at ¶ 2 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 39]

80

See note 57 above

81

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 196 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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made reference to the Almelo Trial discussed above. The Appeals Chamber then discussed the
Einsatzgruppen case, in which the tribunal stated:

the elementary principle must be borne in mind that neither under Control
Council Law No. 10 nor under any known system of criminal law is guilt
for murder confined to the man who pulls the trigger or buries the corpse.
[…] Thus, not only are principles guilty but also accessories, those who take
a consenting part in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or
enterprises involved in its commission, those who order or abet crime, and those
who belong to an organization or group engaged in the commission of crime. These
provisions embody non harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility […]82
This statement is a perfect example of the idea that the international legal system is not
willing to leave a person who engages in group criminality unpunished. A person who has
knowledge of the crime and willingly takes part in promoting the crime is just as guilty as the
person who committed the substantive offense.

ii. Category Two: “Concentration Camp” Cases83
As was the case in Tadic, this group of cases does not apply to the facts of the present
case because the present facts do not involve an organized system designed to mistreat
individuals. However, it is important to note that the requisite elements needed to find someone
guilty of category two offenses include awareness.

82

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 200 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39], citing The United
States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, VOLUME IV 3(U.S. Gov. Printing Office, Washington, 1951)
83

See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No: IT-98-30/1, Judgment 2 November 2001 (hereinafter “Kvocka
Judgment”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]; see also KELLY D. ASKIN, STEPHAN A. REISENFELD
SYMPOSIUM 2002: PROSECUTING WARTIME RAPE AND OTHER GENDER- RELATED CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 288 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]; (Kvocka, Prcac, Kos,
Zigic and Radic were all charged with persecuting detainees of the Omarska concentration camp by committing
abuses such as rape, torture, murder and sexual assault. The Trial Chamber says that “criminal liability will attach
to staff members of the concentration camps who have knowledge of the crimes being committed there, unless their
role is not ‘administrative’ or ‘advisory’ or ‘interwoven with illegality’ or, unless despite having a significant status,
their actual contributions to the enterprise was insignificant.”)
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The second category applies the notion of common purpose or design to kill or mistreat
groups by means of organized systems.84 The mens rea of this offense consists of (a) awareness
of the existence and the nature of the entity designed to kill and mistreat detainees; and (b) the
accused’s intent to further the common criminal design of the entity. The actus reus is simply
active participation (including encouraging, aiding and abetting) in the enforcement of the
system.85
Even though the Chamber added awareness, the focus remained on the voluntary
agreement and participation in common criminal conduct.

iii. Category Three: Pursuing a single course of conduct with natural and
foreseeable consequences.
Under this category, the accused must have intent to participate in a common criminal
purpose, but there appears to be an equivalent of the U.S. strict liability standard for unplanned
actions that occur as a natural and foreseeable consequence of the furthering of the common
purpose.86 It is worthy to note that this category of joint criminal enterprise is essentially the
same as the Felony Murder Doctrine in the Untied States, which says that “a felon and her

84

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 202 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

85

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 202 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39], citing Dachau
Concentration Camp Cases, LAW REPORTS VOLUME XI 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]

86

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No: IT-98-33, Judgment 2 August 2001 (hereinafter “Krstic Judgment”) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 41] (Over the period of several days in July 1995, Bosnian Muslim men, women
and children were forcibly separated from each other. The Trial Chamber found Krstic guilty of being a member of
a joint criminal enterprise for two related incidents. The purpose of the first joint criminal enterprise was to forcibly
transfer Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari, during which many murders, beatings and
rapes were committed. The purpose of the second joint criminal enterprise was to remove Bosnian Muslim men
from Srebrenica, in the commission of which many of the men were killed. The Chamber found that Krstic was
aware that these murders, rapes and beatings were likely to happen while achieving their genocidal purpose.)
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accomplices [can be held] liable for murder when a killing is committed in ‘either the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony.’”87
The Appeals Chamber described this category of cases in terms of “ethnic cleansing,”
where people were forced to leave their homes, most likely against their will. Clearly, the
group’s common purpose was to “cleanse” the community of what they believed to be impure.
The common purpose was not to commit murder. However, while attaining this purpose, it was
foreseeable that people would be murdered, even though murder was not the objective of the
common design.88 In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber drew upon the Essen Lynching and
Borkum Island cases discussed above.89
The Appeals Chamber, whose President, Judge Cassese was from Italy, then looked to
certain Italian precedent, which discussed the material and psychological “causal nexus” between
the common object and the different actions.90 The Tadic Appeals Chamber quoted the Italian
Court in the D’Ottavio et al. case, which stated:

“[i]ndeed the responsibility of the participant […] is not founded on the
notion of objective responsibility […] but on the fundamental principle
of the concurrence of interdependent causes […]; by virtue of this principle
all the participants are accountable for the crime both where they directly
cause it and where they indirectly cause it, in keeping with the well-known
canon causa causae est causa causati.”91
87

KATE BLOCH & KEVIN MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, (unpublished 2002)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 204 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 206 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]; See ESSEN
LYNCHING CASE, supra note 59 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33] (In the Essen Lynching case, a
German captain ordered a soldier to take three British prisoners of war for interrogation and told the soldier not to
interfere with German civilian attacks on the prisoners.)
90

Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 215 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 215 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39] citing D’Ottavio et al
(unpublished) Judgment, on file with International Tribunal’s Library
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In another case, an Italian Court specified that coincidence cannot be confused with a
causal relationship, for unless the unintended act is a “logical development” of the objective
offense, a mere incidental relationship is created.92
In sum, the actus reus elements for all three categories are the same in that they all
require (a) a plurality of persons; with a (b) a common plan, design or purpose (though the plan
does not have to have been previously devised); that (c) the accused participated in to further that
common purpose.93
However, the three categories differ with regards to the mens rea.94 The first category
requires criminal intent (shared by all co-perpetrators) to commit a crime. The second category,
or “concentration camp” cases require (a) personal knowledge of the nature of the system of illtreatment and (b) intent to further the common design of the system, thus expanding on the
mental state needed for category one. The third category requires intent to participate in
furthering the common design of the group, however a member can be additionally liable if an
unplanned act occurs and it was (a) foreseeable that the act could happen in furtherance of the
common purpose; and (b) that the accused willingly took that risk.95
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 218 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39] citing Court of
Cassation, Manelli case, GIUSTIZIA PENALE, PART II, COL. 906, NO. 599, 20 July 1949
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 227 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No: IT-97-25-T, Judgment 15 March 2002 (hereinafter “Krnojelac Judgment”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40] (In this case, the Tribunal did not find Krnojelac guilty of
participating in a joint criminal enterprise. It was found that the defendant did not have the shared intent or the
shared agreement to participate in furthering a common purpose.)
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Tadic Judgment, supra note 56 at ¶ 228 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
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E. Conspiracy, or Something Like It96
Conspiracy, accessorial liability, and other such offenses are criminal actions because in
all of the above, members gather together and somehow aid in the perpetration of a criminal
offense. While it is true that there are differences in the application of these offenses, the
underlying goal that is common to all these offenses is to punish criminal thoughts and actions
(group criminality). The point is that many countries include crimes of conspiracy, common
purpose or sometimes both, suggesting that even countries outside of the U.S. recognize the
importance of using these offenses to further criminal justice.
i. Canada
The law of conspiracy in Canada has been derived primarily from English Law.97
Accordingly, the actus reus for conspiracy is agreement, while the mens rea is the intent to
further the common purpose (with an understood intent to agree).98 Furthermore, the rationale in
Canada, like in the Untied States, is to prevent crimes and to attack against group danger.99
Instead of re-discussing what was already said about conspiracy in the United States, it is better
to examine the law in other countries and to note that conspiracy is just as useful a tool in
countries outside the U.S.
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ii. South Africa
In South Africa, the crime of conspiracy is punishable according to the Riotous Assembly
Act 17 of 1956 §18(2)(a),100 which states that a person, who conspires with another person to aid
in the commission of or to commit any offense, is guilty of conspiracy.101 This statute says that
“it is impossible to come to an agreement with another person without intending to do so.” This
is the same question of mental state discussed earlier.102 A person is guilty of conspiracy not
only if he agrees to commit an offence as a perpetrator or co-perpetrator (section 5.2)103 but also
if he “agrees to promote or facilitate its commission […]”104 According to the code, conspiracy
is a preliminary offense.
Interestingly, South Africa also has “common purpose”, a theory of liability for parties to
an offense. Criminal Code § 5.3 states that two or more people, who act together in furtherance
of a common purpose, are guilty of the common object even if “prior conspiracy” (agreement) is
not shown (express).105 In addition, a person has still acted under the common purpose and can
be punished for an unplanned act occurring in furtherance of the criminal objective.106
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It seems that the difference between these theories of culpability is that conspiracy
focuses on the preliminary actions, while common purpose focuses on the objective of the
common design. Thus, they can be deemed to be two halves of the same offense.
iii. Scotland
Conspiracy law in Scotland is comparable to conspiracy law in the United States.
According to Scottish criminal law, conspiracy occurs when two or more people agree to further
or achieve a criminal purpose. A person can be found guilty of conspiracy even when the
criminal purpose is not achieved, because the crime is the agreement.107 The fact that in most
cases persons commit an overt act that manifest the agreement108 is consistent with the South
African notion that there is no way to agree to a crime without intending to commit offenses in
furtherance of it.
In specific, “art and part” crimes echo the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as
established by the ICTY. If persons have conspired together to commit something through
criminal means, they may be charged as art and part of the crimes without being charged with
conspiracy.109 Thus, art and part guilt punishes group criminality by charging the accused as
being part of the underlying offense, instead of being found guilty of conspiracy. The elements
of the crime do not change even though the application does. Nonetheless, conspiracy is still
recognized as a major crime in Scotland and sometimes courts charge individuals with
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conspiracy instead of art and part guilt.110 This mixed practice can most likely be attributed to
the fact that Scottish criminal law is not codified; as a result, some courts believe that conspiracy
is simply an aggravation of the offense, while others believe that intent to commit the crime is
the same as actually committing the crime.111
iv. Australia
The Australian concept of common purpose is currently used to find persons guilty of
criminal offenses, even if he did not commit the substantive act. The elements of this theory of
liability are the same as joint criminal enterprise. In fact, the terms common purpose, joint
criminal enterprise, common design and concert are all interchangeable terms.112
Australia’s Criminal Code (Q) § 7(1)(b) states that every person who acts (or omits to
act) for the purpose of aiding another person to commit a criminal offense is guilty of that
criminal offense themselves.113 Common purpose is defined when two or more persons reach an
understanding or agreement114 that they will commit a crime. If any one of the agreeing
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members commits an act that constitutes the intended crime, all parties are equally guilty.115
This definition is the same as conspiracy (as defined by statutory law) in the United States.

V. Application Of This Established Law To Hamdan’s Charge Of Conspiracy
The precedent set by these Military Tribunals and national courts shows that conspiracy
and theories very similar to conspiracy not only have been established in international law; they
have been expanded more and more over time in order to prosecute guilty individuals. The most
expansive interpretation of a Tribunal statute was by the ICTY in their introduction of joint
criminal enterprise.116 While this expansive interpretation leaves a lot of room for abuse of
discretion by prosecutors,117 both joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy seem to serve the
retributive and deterrent purposes of criminal punishment, especially crimes that involve such
breaches of international law.118 Before discussing the similarities between joint criminal
enterprise and conspiracy, it will be useful to briefly look at command responsibility to
understand why joint criminal enterprise was established.
In order to prosecute command officials and other persons in superior position, the
Military tribunals have used the theory of command responsibility.119 Under this theory, high-
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ranking officials could be held liable for the offense committed by their soldiers or inferiors.120
However, this type of liability is limited to situations where the officer was aware of the
subordinates actions and failed to take precautions against it.121
Since command responsibility was limited to higher-up officials, it required the Tribunal
to distinguish between superiors and subordinates. So, the ICTY used a broad interpretation of
the ICTY Statute, Article 7 and created joint criminal enterprise.122 This form of liability was
used where command responsibility lacked.123
In theory, joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy are not much different. However, the
two bases of criminality differ, mainly in their application. The Appeals Chamber in the Ojdanic
Judgment distinguished joint criminal enterprise from conspiracy and stated:

Whilst conspiracy requires a showing that several individuals have agreed
to commit a certain crime or set of crimes, a joint criminal enterprise requires,
in addition to such a showing, that the parties to that agreement took action in
furtherance of that agreement. In other words, while mere agreement is sufficient
in the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise
will depend on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that enterprise.124

This statement embodies the primary difference between joint criminal enterprise and
conspiracy- the focus on the common purpose as opposed to the focus on the agreement. Both
crimes require (a) a plurality of persons; (b) some form of participation (physically or mentally)
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of the common objective; (c) the intent required to commit the underlying offense. The differing
focus leads to different application, making joint criminal enterprise a theory of complicity-based
responsibility, while conspiracy remains a crime in itself, thereby allowing direct responsibility
without necessary proof of the underlying offense.125
However, it must be noted that the distinction that the Appeals Chamber in Ojdanic made
does not apply to the present case. The elements of conspiracy applied to Hamdan are: (a) an
agreement to commit or the joining of a criminal enterprise with a common purpose with the
intent of committing one or more substantive offenses triable by military commission; (b)
willfully joining the enterprise with knowledge of the purpose; and (c) committing an overt act to
accomplish some objective of the agreement.126 Conspiracy, as applied by this Military
Tribunal, is no different from joint criminal enterprise. In fact, this definition is most similar to
the third category of joint criminal enterprise, as stated above.
Notwithstanding their differences in application, joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy
both require intent to act in pursuit of a common criminal objective. So, both crimes support the
general principle of criminal law that a person is not guilty unless they have a “guilty mind.”127
“Criminal law does not, as a general rule, address accidental behaviour, nor is it interested in
vicarious liability […]. Those who offend the criminal law are expected to intend the
consequences of their acts.”128
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Joint criminal enterprise was intended to be a sort of “catch-all” mechanism used by the
Appeals Chamber in Tadic in order to punish those individuals who were just as guilty as the
individuals who physically committed the terrible offenses. Conspiracy aims to do the same.
However, the word “conspiracy” causes pause in the international community, perhaps because
of its general inexistence in the civil law countries.129 Despite the overall trepidation of
conspiracy, it has been used in prosecuting international crimes, as discussed above.130
Thus, the similarities between conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise validate the point
that conspiracy is not a new concept in international law. It has been established, in fact, that
conspiracy has been part of international law from the time of the post-WWII tribunals.
Furthermore, conspiracy follows the precedent of broad interpretations of existing Tribunal
statutes.
“By focusing on agreement among parties and by taking on the status of
an individual crime, conspiracy allows the prosecution to avoid the
unnecessary and sometimes fatal focus on a crime committed by another
perpetrator. […] Any concerns that this approach gives prosecutors undue
license to pursue vicarious liability can be checked by requiring a clear showing
of membership in the conspiratorial group as well as intent to enter into an
agreement with a criminal purpose.”131
The goal is to punish the “masterminds” of conspiracy as well as peripheral members, thereby
satisfying the goals of attacking the dangers of group criminality.132 As detailed above, joint
criminal enterprise strives to do the same.
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A basic understanding of criminal law illustrates the concepts of retribution and
deterrence. Retribution seeks to punish a criminal for what he deserves by looking at his past
actions and determining his individual blameworthiness.133 Deterrence aims to reduce the crime
with a prospective focus, by instilling fear of the law in a person.134 These concepts are not
limited to the United States idea of criminal justice. They extend even to the international
criminal justice system, as the purpose of the Tribunals is to punish the acts of people who have
terrorized thousands (even millions).
Conspiracy holds persons directly responsible for their role in committing a crime, thus
furthering the deterrent purpose of criminal punishment.135 The all-encompassing nature or
conspiracy, with proper protection in place,136serves the retributive goal of international criminal
law by punishing each individual that furthered the common criminal objective in the same way
joint criminal enterprise has done in previous tribunals.

VI. An Additional Concern Regarding Hamdan’s Charge
Hamdan’s charge of conspiracy raises an additional concern that may be too complex to
detail in this memorandum, given the time constraints as well as the specificity of the original
issue presented. However, it should not be left without being discussed. It is very possible that
the defense will raise (or have already raised) an objection to being charged with war crimes,
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arguing that no acts took place within the boundaries of war. Since the analysis for this
argument requires a memo in itself, a brief discussion to raise the issues must suffice at the
present.
As stated right now, Hamdan has been charged with conspiracy to commit several
crimes; but the Department of Defense has not specified whether or not these crimes constitute
war crimes (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention) or whether they constitute crimes
against humanity.137 Although both categories of crimes are very serious breaches of
international humanitarian law, and both should be punished in order to satisfy the goals of
criminal law, war crimes are limited to the crimes committed in occupied territory.138
The Nuremberg Charter stated that war crimes were acts committed against nationals of
another state in connection with war, while crimes against humanity were acts committed against
the nationals of the same state as that of the perpetrator, also in connection with war.139 Scholars
have established that now, crimes against humanity under customary international law extend to
peacetime as well.140
Thus, the statute for the ICTR defines “crimes against humanity” by stating:
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“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a
widespread, or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) murder; (b) extermination;
(c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane
acts. (emphasis added)” The ICTY statute says the same, but the ICTR statute
is “the most recent codification of crimes against humanity.”141
Looking at the elements of this definition, it is clear that crimes against humanity are no longer
limited to crimes committed against nationals of ones own state. It extends to any civilian
population.
With this said, it may be more fruitful to charge Hamdan with conspiracy to commit
crimes against humanity, instead of conspiracy to commit war crimes. The only condition that
must be met is that the acts must have been part of a widespread, systematic attack based on
political, racial and religious grounds. First, the concept of jihad is a religious war against those
believed to be interfering with the goals of Islamic nations by acting in the interest of the western
government.142 According to the fatwa issued in February 1998, it is the duty of all able
Muslims to attack against Americans “anywhere they can be found.”143 These attacks occurred
in the form of various bombings in different places across the world, specifically attacking the
United States. The basis for all the attacks Hamdan has been charged with conspiracy to commit
were done on both religious and political grounds in a widespread and systematic manner. The
acts that Hamdan assisted with committing include murder, which is clearly stated as a crime
against humanity under the ICTR statute, as well as terrorism, which is an “other inhumane act.”
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Although this analysis was not in depth and did not explore all the factors that contribute
to the boundaries of war or a charge of conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, it
provides a retort to a possible argument that could be raised (or already has been raised) by the
defense counsel.
VII. Conclusion
The elements of conspiracy, according to the United States Department of Defense Rules
and Regulations for crimes triable by military commission include overt acts.144 Accordingly,
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit crimes such as attacking civilians, attacking
civilian object, murder by an unprivileged belligerent, destruction of property by an unprivileged
belligerent and terrorism.145 The rationale of the prior uses of conspiracy, common purpose and
joint criminal enterprise all suggest that conspiracy is a valid charge. As discussed in Part II of
this memorandum, Al Qaida has committed horrible crimes for many years now by training
militants to assist the leaders in accomplishing their tasks. It may be true that Hamdan could
have been replaced by another person acting in the same way, but it remains that each role
furthering such crimes is an important part of the overall criminal achievement. The “cogs of a
wheel” theory146 holds even today.
Unlike some of the cases in the ICTY, where evidence was lacking or sparse, there is
clear evidence that Hamdan was involved with furthering Al Qaida’s purpose of jihad against the
United States and other western countries. However, Hamdan was not a front man, high-ranking
official, or even a key player. He was a member of the peripheral group of conspirators that
144
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supplied the main members with the ammunition required to achieve their goals. He protected
the mission by protecting the leaders of Al Qaida and served as their driver. Hamdan’s actions
may not have been unlawful in themselves, but they contributed to an unlawful purpose.
The retributive and deterrent goals of international criminal law seek to punish precisely
this activity. Al Qaida is a prime example of the dangers of group criminality, because the larger
the group, the more able they are to commit an innumerable amount of serious crimes.
Thus, not only has conspiracy been established in international law, it will further the
goals of international law, just as prior doctrines such as joint criminal enterprise have in the
past. This time, the name has just been changed to conspiracy.
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